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PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
William C. Heffernan*
INTRODUCTION
"There is nothing," wrote William Blackstone, "Which so
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property."' The framers of the Fourth
Amendment2 surely would have agreed with this. Indeed, it is
well known that they were deeply influenced by the property
rights analysis Lord Camden employed in the 1765 case of
Entick v. Carrington.3 In Entick, Camden argued as a general
matter that the "great end, for which men entered into society,
* Associate Professor of Law, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the
Graduate Center, City University of New York. The author thanks Marc Bernstein,
Noel Carter, Matthew G. Mayer and Steven Wasserman for their comments on an
earlier draft of this Article.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). For analysis of Entick's significance for
the framers of the Fourth Amendment, see NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
47-49 (1937) and JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
CouRT: A STuDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29 (1966). In Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the case in which the Supreme Court first attempted
a systematic construction of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Bradley, writing for
the Court, stated: "It [Lord Camden's opinion in Entick] is regarded as one of the
permanent monuments of the British Constitution, and is quoted by English au-
thorities on that subject down to the present time." Id. at 626. Contemporary ac-
knowledgement of Entick's importance is to be found in Judge Easterbrook's con-
curring opinion in Soldal v. Cook County, 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992), discussed infra at notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
Judge Easterbrook began his concurrence by remarking- "One might think from
reading the dissenting opinion that we have rejected Entick v. Carrington." Id. at
1080.
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was to secure their property." In applying his property-based
approach to the search and seizure of private papers, Camden
stated:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will
hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of
England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are re-
moved and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an
aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages
in that respect.5
Early in this century, the Supreme Court, taking its cue
from Camden's Entick remarks, treated property rights as
dispositive in determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
In Olmstead v. United States,6 a case now remembered chiefly
for a great Brandeis dissent,' the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect a home dweller against wiretaps
of his or her phone conversations as long as those taps are not
the product of a trespass on the home dweller's property. Since
there was no trespass on the Olmstead defendants' property,
the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was simply
not relevant to the case. "There was no searching," the Court
stated. "There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the
use of the sense of hearing and that only."'
In the years following Olmstead, property rights were
dethroned as the central concern of fourth amendment juris-
prudence. In Warden v. Hayden,9 the Warren Court remarked
that it was unwilling "'to import into the law [of search and
seizure] * * * subtle distinctions, developed ... by the common
law in evolving the body of private property law."" Two
19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
'Id.
6 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
It was in Olmstead that Justice Brandeis claimed that the Constitution pro-
tects "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." Id. at 478. Interestingly, Brandeis had previously
used the phrase "right to be let alone" in speaking of a common law right of
privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). In the article, Warren and Brandeis acknowledged
that it was Thomas Cooley who coined the phrase "right to be let alone." See id.
at 195 n.4.
277 U.S. at 464.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
l' Id. at 305 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)).
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months after Hayden, the Court overruled Olmstead, holding
in Katz v. United States" that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects individuals from wiretapping even when no trespass has
been committed. 2 Katz, it is clear, stands for the proposition
that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests indepen-
dently of its protection of property interests.
Katz's reach has been so substantial, however, that one
could plausibly read it and the numerous cases that flowed
from it as holding something more-as holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects property interests only to the extent that
it protects privacy interests.13 Thus, to take an obvious exam-
ple, in the post-Katz world of the 1970s and 1980s, one might
have argued that the Fourth Amendment protects the home (a
critical property interest) whenever government officials enter
it and examine its contents, but that the amendment offers no
protection for mere seizure of the home as a physical entity.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on examining
the Supreme Court's post-Katz decisions, reached exactly this
conclusion in Soldal v. Cook County,' holding that a trailer
home was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment when members of the Cook County sheriff's office aided
employees of a trailer park in severing the home's connection
to park facilities and hauling it away to another location. No
privacy interest was implicated in this eviction process, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, so the Fourth Amendment did not
come into play. 5
11 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12 Id. at 353.
13 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) ("Since Katz, the
touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question of whether 'a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'") (quot-
ing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)). Indeed, even before Katz, the
Court seemed to make privacy the central issue in fourth amendment jurispru-
dence. For example, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), it stated that "the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property." Id. at 304.
1' The Seventh Circuit decided Soldal in two stages. In the first case, the
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. See Soldal v. Cook County,
923 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1991). The Circuit then reheard the case en banc, affirm-
ing in part and reversing in part. See Soldal v. Cook County, 942 F.2d 1073 (7th
Cir. 1991) (en banc), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
"1 942 F.2d at 1076-79.
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The Supreme Court disagreed. 6 The Court concluded, as
the Seventh Circuit had, that an eviction proceeding in which
government officials do not effect entry into a home does not
implicate fourth amendment privacy interests. However, the
Court also concluded that because of its prohibition of unrea-
sonable seizures of houses, the Fourth Amendment is nonethe-
less implicated when officials aid in the termination of property
interests. 7 Soldal does not take us back to Olmstead. On the
Supreme Court's analysis, Soldal creates independently action-
able interests-a privacy interest that is protected in the ab-
sence of interference with a property interest (as in a wiretap-
ping case) and a property interest that is protected in the ab-
sence of interference with a privacy interest (as in a govern-
ment-aided eviction). To use the Fourth Amendment's termi-
nology, the Court now recognizes the possibility of a search
without a seizure and the further possibility of a seizure with-
out a search.'"
In this Article, I consider the implications of this multi-
interest analysis of the Fourth Amendment. In particular, I
examine three cases decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in which property interests played a role independent
of privacy interests. I begin by considering the interpretive
framework that underlies the Supreme Court's multi-interest
analysis. The key to this framework lies in a disjunctive inter-
pretation of the terms "search" and "seizure," one which does
not require a search and a seizure to trigger fourth amend-
ment protection, but instead allows for the possibility of fourth
amendment protection when a search occurs in the absence of
a seizure, or a seizure in the absence of a search. 9 After I
16 See Soldal, 113 S. Ct. 538.
17 Id. at 544.
1 The Court first made clear its receptiveness to a disjunctive analysis of the
phrase "searches and seizures" in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984). By contrast, under Chief Justice Tafts analysis in Olmstead, a search
cannot occur within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it involves an
item that can be seized. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Although he did not com-
ment on it, one must assume that Taft allowed for the possibility of a seizure
without a search-for example, an arrest not accompanied by a search of the
arrestee's person.
19 The Court employed a disjunctive analysis of the terms "searches and sei-
zures" in Soldal, where it remarked that "our cases . . . hold that seizures of
property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within
the meaning of the Amendment has taken place." Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 547 (citing
[Vol. 60: 633
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consider Supreme Court opinions that bear on this interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, I turn to recent Second Circuit
cases in which the property/privacy distinction is relevant. My
particular concern with regard to Second Circuit opinions is
with forfeiture seizures, a subject that takes on special impor-
tance in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Soldal that
the Fourth Amendment offers independent protection for prop-
erty interests, apart from privacy interests.
I. THE SUPREME COURT ON THE FOURTH AMENDENT'S
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
In his opinion for the Court in United States v.
Jacobsen," Justice Stevens stated that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects "two types of expectations, one involving 'search-
es,' the other 'seizures."'' Stevens linked searches to privacy,
stating that a "'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."2
In contrast, he linked seizures to two types of interests. On the
one hand, he stated, a "'seizure' of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possesso-
ry interests in that property." 3 On the other hand, he argued,
a "'seizure' of a person [occurs when there is] ... meaningful
interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of
movement."'
Although Justice Stevens's comments attracted little atten-
tion at the time Jacobsen was decided, they in fact provide a
remarkably lucid framework for thinking about the Fourth
Amendment. If one looks at the cases that preceded Jacobsen,
one can see that Stevens's analysis incorporated the Court's
conclusions in Katz and, by implication, its rejection of
Olmstead.25 If one looks forward from Jacobsen, one can see
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120-25 (1984)); see also United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1974).
20 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
21 Id. at 113.
2Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 113 n.5.
2' The Katz Court did not advance a disjunctive analysis of the phrase
.searches and seizures." Indeed, it remarked that "the question . . . is whether the
search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards."
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that his comments anticipated the Court's conclusions in
Soldal."6 By tracing this process of interpretive development,
we can note not only changes in doctrine but also the challeng-
es that can be mounted against both past and present interpre-
tations of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Olmstead's Practice-Based Originalism
It was in Olmstead that the Court first confronted the
constitutional implications of electronic surveillance. All forms
of electronic surveillance that do not involve some form of
physical trespass pose an interpretive challenge for the Fourth
Amendment. In Entick, it will be recalled, Lord Camden de-
clared that "though the eye cannot by the laws of England be
guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and
carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggra-
vation of the trespass."" If one takes Entick as a guide to the
Fourth Amendment's meaning, then it would seem that while
the amendment is indeed concerned with privacy-hence the
aggravation of harm when private papers are removed and
carried away-its protection comes into play only when there
is an encroachment on physical items-i.e., when there is a
trespass on them.
In wiretapping the phone conversations of the Olmstead
defendants, federal officials carefully avoided trespassing on
the defendants' property. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Taft described the way in which the wiretaps were placed:
Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from
the residences of four of the [defendants] and those leading from the
chief office [used by the defendants]. The insertions were made with-
out trespass upon any property of the defendants. They were made
in the basement of the large office building. The taps from house
lines were made in the streets near the houses.
28
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967). Justice Stevens's suggestion that
the term "searches" implicates privacy interests makes it possible to say that in
both Katz and Olmstead, government officials conducted a search without a sei-
zure.
26 In fact, the Soldal Court drew on Justice Stevens's Jacobsen framework in
holding that a seizure of property can occur in the absence of a search of that
property. See Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 547 (1992).
27 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
28 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928).
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Taft viewed these facts as critical to a proper resolution of the
case. To understand why he took this position, it is essential to
note that he relied on an interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment he had first outlined when writing for the Court in
Carroll v. United States, 9 decided three years before
Olmstead. In Carroll, Taft stated that the Fourth Amendment
"is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when it was adopted."'0 This inter-
pretive theory may be termed "practice-based originalism,"
31
an originalism that focuses not on the general aims of those
drafting a constitutional provision, but instead on specific prac-
tices the provision's drafters wished to prohibit.
Using this kind of originalism as his guide, Taft provided
two rationales for holding the Fourth Amendment irrelevant in
Olmstead. The first rationale, clearly the dominant one as far
as he was concerned, was that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to prohibit unreasonable trespasses on property.
The second rationale, its inconsistency with the first Taft
seems not to have noted, was that the Amendment was de-
signed to protect people in their possession of material things;
the "Amendment itself," Taft noted, "shows that the search is
to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers or
his effects."33 Taken on its own, this second rationale would
make the Fourth Amendment irrelevant to electronic surveil-
lance even when government officials carry out surveillance by
means of a trespass. If the amendment's scope is limited to
material things, then uttered words would not come within the
amendment's purview. Because Taft seems to have been un-
aware of the inconsistency between his two rationales, we can
29 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22 Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
21 To my knowledge, no one else has used the terms "practice-" and "principle-
based originalism." The distinction, however, is implicit in many discussions of
originalism. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTiNG OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 143-60 (1990). Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not draw
on any version of the distinction in his defense of Chief Justice Taft's constitution-
al jurisprudence. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINC. L.
REV. 849 (1989).
2 "The evidence [in the case] was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
33 Id.
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assume that he wished to resolve the case on the basis of the
first, trespassory rationale. The inconsistency should not be ig-
nored, however, for it raises the question, which will be con-
sidered later: whether the Fourth Amendment, when it is con-
strued as offering independent protection for property inter-
ests, protects intangible, as well as tangible, property.34
On either Olmstead's first or second rationale, it should be
noted, Taft allowed for the possibility of incidental fourth
amendment protection for privacy interests-that is, for pro-
tection of privacy interests as long as government officials have
interfered with some property interest that has a bearing on
privacy. This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is en-
tirely consistent with Camden's comments in Entick. But while
Camden made Entick hinge on the factors Taft cited in
Olmstead, it is also clear that Camden accorded substantial
weight to informational privacy as a value in its own right.
While characterizing private papers as goods and chattel, Cam-
den stated that they are their owner's "dearest property" and
that their illegal seizure constitutes an "aggravation of [a]
trespass."35 Given remarks such as these, one need not go
beyond constitutional originalism in challenging Taft's
Olmstead conclusions. That is, one could argue for a principle-
rather than a practice-based originalism and so give weight to
the values, and not simply the practices, that the Fourth
Amendment's framers took seriously. Justice Brandeis ap-
pealed to this principle-based originalism in his Olmstead
dissent when he argued that clauses "guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power must
have a... capacity of adaptation to a changing world."36
Brandeis's point underscores the narrowness of Taft's analysis.
Given Camden's language, it is clear that eighteenth-century
jurists accorded substantial weight to privacy interests. It thus
seems foolish indeed to confine one's originalism to specific
practices. The concerns of the framers provide the foundation
for reversing Taft's conclusions."
See infra notes 99, 164 and accompanying text.
" 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765) (emphasis added).
" 277 U.S. at 472; see also id. at 473 ("In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may
be.") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"' According to the arguments I advance here, Judge Bork can be classified as
[Vol. 60: 633
1994] PROPERTY; PRIVACY, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 641
B. Katz's Principle-Based Originalism
Despite widespread criticism of Olmstead's framework,"
the Court adhered for decades to Taft's approach in the case.
During that time, Court opinions sometimes used Olmstead
not to endorse but to reject government surveillance efforts.
For example, in Silverman v. United States,9 the Court em-
ployed Olmstead's physical trespass framework in holding
inadmissible evidence secured through the insertion of a "spike
mike" a few inches into a suspect's wall. The facts of the case,
the Silverman Court stated, did not require it to consider the
larger question of whether to overrule Olmstead. It was
enough to note that "the eavesdropping [in the case] was ac-
complished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration
a principle-based originalist. See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986). Commenting on
original intent, Judge Bork stated:
In short, all the intentionalist requires is that the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but
with a major premise. That premise states a core value that the Framers
intended to protect. The intentionalist judge must then supply the minor
premise in order to protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances
the Framers could not foresee.
Id. at 826.
Brandeis and Bork would thus have reached the same result in Olmstead.
Moreover, one would have to say that they would have reached this result for
much the same reason. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. However,
Brandeis presented other, nonoriginalist justifications for suppressing the evidence
in Olmstead-(1) that the Constitution protects a "right to be let alone" and (2)
that, whatever one's position on the constitutionality of the eavesdropping conduct-
ed in Olmstead, federal courts should not accept as evidence information gained
through violation of a state criminal statute. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). I have not thought it necessary
to comment on these arguments here since I think principle-based originalism
provides sufficient grounds for rejecting Taft's conclusions. Brandeis's alternative
arguments are relevant in other contexts, however. Indeed, while the explicit text
of the Constitution provides adequate protection for privacy as informational con-
trol, it does not for other kinds of privacy that come within the umbrella term
"the right to be let alone." Although I rely on principle-based originalism in resolv-
ing the Olmstead/Katz sequence of cases, I do not wish it to be understood that I
think principle-based originalism exhausts the range of legitimate approaches to
constitutional jurisprudence.
"8 Criticism came from the highest source. The Communications Act of 1934
provided statutory protection against the kind of wiretapping undertaken in
Olmstead. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-
04 (1934).
39 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
into the premises occupied by the petitioners."'
No such easy distinctions were available to the Court in
Katz v. United States.41 During the course of their investiga-
tion of Katz, government agents meticulously complied with
Olmstead's strictures on physical encroachment. While gather-
ing evidence against Katz for alleged violation of gambling
laws, agents noted that often he had made phone calls from a
public booth located near his home. Believing that Katz was
conducting a gambling pool by means of the calls, and without
securing a warrant for their actions, the agents placed a listen-
ing device on top of the booth, which picked up only Katz's end
of his phone conversations." The placement of the device was
clearly consistent with the framework Taft adopted in
Olmstead. Katz had no possessory interest in the phone booth,
so he could not complain about a trespass on it. And in any
event, the device was placed in such a way that no penetration
was made into the ceiling of the phone booth.
Given these facts, Katz directly raised the question of
whether the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests
independently of its protection of property interests. Writing
for the Court, Justice Stewart held that it does. Quoting War-
den v. Hayden,43 a case decided only six months before Katz,
Justice Stewart stated that the "'premise that property inter-
ests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited.' " Continuing in this vein, Stewart ar-
gued that "the Fourth Amendment governs not only the sei-
zure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of
oral statements, overheard without any 'technical trespass
under... local property law."'45 The activities of the agents
investigating Katz, Stewart concluded, "Violated the privacy
upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."4"
Given these remarks, there can be no doubt that Stewart
so Id. at 509.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42 Id. at 348.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
44 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden, 387 U.S. at 304).
" Id (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
46 Id.
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recognized privacy as an independent variable within fourth
amendment jurisprudence. However, precisely because he took
this position, Stewart was also careful to note the kind of pri-
vacy the amendment protects. The amendment, Stewart de-
clared, does not protect a "person's general right to privacy."47
Eighteen months prior to Katz, the Court had stated in
Griswold v. Connecticut" that "penumbras" of various consti-
tutional provisions protect a married couple's "privacy" right to
use contraceptives.49 The Fourth Amendment was among the
penumbra-generating provisions cited in Griswold." But giv-
en Stewart's disclaimer that the Fourth Amendment does not
offer general privacy protection, it is clear that in Katz Stewart
was concerned only with informational privacy-that is, he was
concerned only with the type of privacy in which individuals
control the dissemination of information about themselves. 51
Informational privacy is an intangible good. Information can,
of course, be embedded in a tangible item-think, for example,
about how facts concerning someone's life can be discovered by
reading that person's diary. But embeddedness is hardly essen-
tial to informational privacy. Indeed, the facts in Katz illus-
trate well how informational privacy can be important when
only uttered words are at stake. In Katz, information was
communicated simply through sounds and the meanings those
sounds convey. What is critical to informational privacy, then,
is not the presence of a physical "shell" that contains facts
about someone's life, but an individual's control over the dis-
semination of the facts themselves.
Bearing this point in mind, it will be possible to see how
Stewart gave modern meaning to the understandings about
7 Id. at 350.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 484.
G' Id.
rl It is important to note that, in Katz, Justice Stewart went out of his way to
distinguish between the comprehensive concept of privacy employed by the
Griswold Court and the narrower conception of privacy with which he was con-
cerned in Katz. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5. Stewart was among the dissenters
in Griswold. His approach to Katz was entirely consistent with his approach to
Griswold, for while he rejected the proposition that the Constitution creates a
"general right of privacy," 381 U.S. at 530, he was prepared to hold that the
Fourth Amendment provides a textually grounded foundation for a limited type of
privacy-that is, informational privacy.
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privacy that had prevailed in the eighteenth century. To Cam-
den (Entick's author) and to the framers of the Fourth Amend-
ment, informational privacy was indeed a matter of
embeddedness-that is, to eighteenth-century minds, one en-
joyed privacy by exerting control over tangible objects such as
one's house or one's papers. The words of the Fourth Amend-
ment reflect this understanding. They refer only to tangible
objects-persons, houses, papers, and effects-that to eight-
eenth- as well as twentieth-century minds have a central bear-
ing on a person's existence as a distinct individual. Stewart's
updating of the Fourth Amendment was, admittedly, awkward
as far as terminology is concerned, for while one can seize and
then search a person's house or papers (and so discover secrets
about that person's life), one cannot "seize" a conversation, nor
is it particularly graceful to speak of "searching" a conversa-
tion.
This terminological point conceded, though, it is obvious
that Camden and the Fourth Amendment's framers were vital-
ly concerned with informational privacy. Once again, think of
Entick's reference to private papers as their owner's "dearest
property" and the Fourth Amendment's inventory of items es-
sential to sustaining individual identity. In Katz, Stewart sim-
ply acknowledged a brute fact of modern life-that changes in
technology have made it possible for the government routinely
to interfere with informational control in settings where facts
about a person's life are not embedded in a tangible object.
Stewart's approach can thus be justified as a form of principle-
based originalism. In advancing this originalist justification for
Katz, I do not wish to suggest that nonoriginalism should be
rejected as an approach to constitutional law. My point is nar-
rower. I am arguing only that when a specific portion of the
Constitution's text is to be construed, interpretation should
begin (though it need not end) with consideration of the aims
the provision's framers wished to achieve. Taking the framers'
intentions as the starting point for thinking about Katz also
justifies the opinion, making it clear that Stewart, rather than
Taft, captured the underlying aims of the amendment's fram-
ers.
[Vol. 60: 633
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C. Determining Katz's Reach
Did Katz turn Olmstead on its head? That is, where
Olmstead had made it necessary to show infringement of a
property interest to assert a fourth amendment claim, did Katz
make it necessary to show infringement of a privacy interest to
assert such a claim? As we shall see, the answer to these ques-
tions is "no": Katz heralded not another single-variable ap-
proach to the Fourth Amendment, but instead a multi-variable
approach in which privacy, property and liberty interests stand
on their own. Katz's reach has been so substantial, however,
that it is worthwhile thinking about what fourth amendment
jurisprudence would be like if an infringement of privacy were
indeed a prerequisite to claiming the amendment's protection.
This idea can be explored by examining the Seventh Circuit's
en banc opinion in Soldal v. County of Cook.52 As I noted in
the Introduction, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Seventh Circuit in Soldal, so that the lower court's conclusions
are simply a matter of historical curiosity. They are, however,
a matter of substantial curiosity, for they demonstrate how, in
puzzling out Katz's significance, a widely respected lower cir-
cuit court judge, Richard Posner, concluded that privacy is
indeed the organizing concept for fourth amendment jurispru-
dence.
At stake in Soldal was a claim that the Fourth Amend-
ment was implicated by the removal of a trailer home from its
mooring in a trailer park. The owner of the trailer park, Ter-
race Properties, brought an eviction suit in an Illinois state
court against Edward Soldal, who lived in the trailer home
with his wife and four children. Two weeks prior to the evic-
tion hearing, the officers at Terrace Property decided to pro-
ceed with the eviction immediately. Because the Terrace offi-
cials feared resistance, they were accompanied by Cook County
deputy sheriffs, who told Soldal that they were present to re-
strain him in case he tried to prevent the eviction. The Terrace
officials damaged the Soldals' trailer home as they removed it
from its moorings and towed it out of the trailer park's lot. No
eviction order was ever issued in the case since the Soldals had
5' 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
already been expelled from the trailer park.53
The Soldals subsequently brought a § 1983 action for mon-
ey damages against the deputies who had aided in their evic-
tion. After the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the deputies, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.54 The circuit judges
then granted a petition to rehear the case en banc, at which
time Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion for a narrowly
divided court. Posner began by agreeing with the reasoning
employed by the three-judge panel in holding that the case had
properly been brought under § 1983. To survive a summary
judgment motion in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege
that a defendant acted under color of state law and that, in
doing so, the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federally
guaranteed right.5 The second point lay at the heart of the
case, for the Soldals claimed, and the deputy sheriffs denied,
that their trailer home had been "seized" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment when it was uprooted from its moor-
ings and towed away. Even the first point was in doubt,
though, for it was the Terrace Park officials who uprooted the
home, not the deputies. Judge Posner, however, held that,
given the state of the record, the deputies' actions satisfied the
"under-color-of-state-law" requirement of § 1983. Because his
eviction was unlawful, Posner noted, Soldal had a common law
right to resist it. According to the record, it was the deputy
sheriffs who prevented Soldal from exercising his right of resis-
tance. Posner thus concluded that the record required the court
to assume that the deputies had conspired with the Terrace
Park officials to evict the Soldals.5"
This brought Posner to what he called a question of "sur-
prising novelty, [one with] implications for other forms of evic-
tion and even perhaps for the repossession of automobiles and
other personal property."5 The question, Posner noted, had to
do with Fourth Amendment claims about property. The
Soldals, he pointed out, had wisely avoided mounting a due
process challenge to their eviction. Because Illinois law made it
5 Id. at 1074.
'4 See 923 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1991).
5 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
' 942 F.2d at 1075.
57 Id.
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possible for the Soldals to sue the deputies for the damages
caused by their illegal eviction,58 it is unlikely that they
would have been able to bring a § 1983 action predicated on
due process liability.59 Posner thus suggested that the ques-
tion before the court was "whether the Fourth Amendment
should be bent to provide the Soldals with still another reme-
dy. 6
0
In holding that it does not, Posner argued that the amend-
ment should be considered as a provision that protects proper-
ty interests only as an incident to its protection of privacy
interests. He stated:
In modern law the interests in property and in (Fourth Amendment)
privacy are protected by different constitutional provisions and by
different bodies of constitutional doctrine. It is true that the older
cases, illustrated by Olmstead, often tied the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to property concepts, such as trespass. The
modern cases, however, well illustrated by Katz, which overruled
Olmstead, refocus the amendment from property to privacy in accor-
dance with Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead. This leaves de-
privations of property to be regulated by the due process clause [and
the takings clause]. [Neither one of which Posner considered rele-
vant to the case].61
Reasoning from this premise, Posner had little difficulty dis-
posing with a claim that the Soldals' interest in informational
privacy had been infringed by the eviction. "The police did not
enter Soldal's trailer home," Posner noted. "They did not rum-
mage among his possessions."62 The confidential status of the
Soldals' "papers and effects" had thus not been impaired.63
But in treating privacy as the organizing concept of fourth
amendment analysis, Posner had to allow for another type of
privacy besides informational control, for the amendment,
through its proscription of unreasonable seizures of the person,
clearly has a bearing on a person's interest in freedom of move-
ment. Posner thus posited that the amendment also protects
18 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, para. 221 (1980).
s9 In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Court held that a due process
property rights claim is not actionable under § 1983 unless a plaintiff has no
adequate judicial remedies available under state law.
" 942 F.2d at 1076.
" Id. at 1077 (citation omitted).
62 Id.
W Id.
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an individual's interest in privacy-as-personal-solitude, an
interest that is implicated by an intrusion into a person's home
and also by physical detention, such as an arrest or a forcible
stop.' It is on this point that Posner's analysis is open to
challenge.
One challenge is relatively abstract in nature, though
critical to our general understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment. It is plausible to think of a seizure of the person as im-
plicating an interest in personal solitude when one is speaking
of arrests or forcible stops. Even here, the characterization is
only barely plausible, for one strains accepted usage in speak-
ing of the arrest of a pedestrian who is disturbing the peace by
screaming in the middle of the night as an interference with
personal solitude. One goes beyond mere strain of usage,
though, if one says that police use of deadly force against, say,
a fleeing felon constitutes an interference with personal soli-
tude. Given the Supreme Court's conclusion in Tennessee v.
Garner65 that the use of deadly force in a fleeing-felon setting
constitutes a "seizure of the person" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment," one must conclude that an interest in
privacy-as-personal-solitude is at most an occasional adjunct to
the interest central to all seizures of the person-the interest
in physical liberty.67 This point alone makes Posner's unitary
analysis of the Fourth Amendment unacceptable. Clearly, the
amendment protects an interest in physical liberty that only
sometimes overlaps with an individual's interest in personal
solitude.
One more difficulty with Posner's privacy analysis must be
considered. If one were to reason in terms of Posner's unitary
approach to the Fourth Amendment, then one would have to
confront the question of whether the Soldals' interest in priva-
cy-as-personal-solitude was infringed by their eviction. Al-
though the record is silent about key facts related to this point,
64 Id.
6' 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
66 Id. at 7-9.
This is also the conclusion Justice Stevens reached in Jacobsen; there he
stated that "a 'seizure' of a person [occurs] within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment [when there is] meaningful interference, however brief, with an
individual's freedom of movement." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
n.5 (1984).
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it seems safe to assume that the Soldals' personal solitude was
shattered when they heard people outside their trailer home
making preparations to remove it from its moorings. Moreover,
the record does make clear that the Soldals' opportunity for
solitude was impaired after the eviction, for their home was
towed away and left without any connection to sewer pipes and
electrical wires. In taking these points into account, Posner
might argue that the Fourth Amendment protects against only
certain kinds of intrusions on solitude. This claim, however,
would have to be tested against the amendment's reference to
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their... houses.""
Given the text's obvious concern with this dimension of per-
sonal security, Posner should have explained why, on his pri-
vacy conception of the Fourth Amendment, the Soldals were
without legal protection.
If we set aside privacy for a moment, we can at least see
why Posner was on fairly firm ground in not treating property
as an independently actionable interest under the Fourth
Amendment. Posner, of course, recognized that the Jacobsen
Court had stated that the Fourth Amendment protects posses-
sory interests by virtue of its prohibition of unreasonable sei-
zures of houses, papers and effects." He also conceded that
"[literally there was a seizure here."" However, Posner went
on to say that "to use a literal interpretation of a constitutional
provision enacted two centuries ago" would be to trivialize the
provision and, in the process, "make every repossession and
eviction [carried out] with police assistance actionable" under
the amendment.7' On this point, Posner's argument was quite
strong, for despite Jacobsen's reference to possessory interests,
it was by no means clear that the Court was prepared to give
substantial weight to fourth amendment claims involving prop-
erty, as opposed to privacy and liberty, interests.
An example--drawn from Oliver v. United States,72 a case
Posner also cited73-- will illustrate the stepchild status of
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
G' Soldal v. Cook County, 942 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
7 Id. at 1077.
71 Id.
72 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
7" 942 F.2d at 1079.
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property rights in post-Katz jurisprudence. At stake in Oliver
were government efforts to locate marijuana grown in open
fields. Despite "No trespassing" signs posted prominently on
the defendant's property, government agents entered his land,
drove past his house, and traveled several hundred yards along
a road until they reached an open field, where they discovered
patches of marijuana. It was only after they had made this
discovery that the officers obtained a search warrant and re-
turned to the field to gather the marijuana, which was then
used as evidence against the defendant.74
Given these facts, the Court could readily have invoked
Jacobsen, which it had decided only fifteen days earlier, to hold
that the defendant had suffered a "meaningful interference"
with his property interests in his lands, thus triggering fourth
amendment protection. Instead, in holding the Fourth Amend-
ment inapplicable in the case, the Court focused exclusively on
the defendant's privacy interests, which, it concluded, had not
been infringed by the government agents' activities. "Since
Katz," the Court remarked, "the touchstone of [Fourth] Amend-
ment analysis has been ... whether a person has a 'constitu-
tionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' ' 75 In
holding that the defendant did not, the Court stated that open
fields, unlike the home, "do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance."7 As for the
fact of trespass, the Court simply stated that the "existence of
a property right is but one element in determining whether
expectations of privacy are legitimate."7 It was understand-
able, then, that Posner gave little weight to property as an
independent factor in fourth amendment analysis. Oliver, it
must be remembered, treated privacy as "the touchstone" of
fourth amendment jurisprudence.78 Katz indeed seemed to
have turned Olmstead on its head.
We can summarize a somewhat complicated argument by
bearing three points in mind. The first is that it is a mistake
74 466 U.S. at 170.
" Id. at 177 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
71 Id. at 179.
" Id. at 183.
78 Id. at 170.
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to treat privacy as the unifying concept of fourth amendment
jurisprudence. Although the Oliver Court spoke of privacy as
the "touchstone" for the Fourth Amendment, it is clear, what-
ever the status of property interests under the amendment,
that the Court conceived of the amendment as protecting an
analytically distinct liberty interest-that is, an interest in
freedom from physical restraint. Second, even if one were to
adopt a single-interest approach (such as Posner's) that focuses
on privacy, one might have to concede that activities such as
evictions implicate the Fourth Amendment to the extent that
they interfere with privacy-as-personal-solitude. But third, one
certainly would have to concede that, post-Katz, the Court was
less than clear about the status of property interests under the
Fourth Amendment. If we say that federal circuit court judges
engage in a process of divination (with the Supreme Court as
the inscrutable oracle whose sayings they must interpret), then
one can readily understand why a judge such as Posner could
conclude that property interests enjoy no special protection as
such under the Fourth Amendment.
D. Soldal in the Supreme Court
Soldal reached a Court particularly receptive to claims
about the Constitution's protection of property interests. In the
years immediately preceding Soldal, the Court had carefully
considered takings-clause and due process challenges involving
a wide variety of property issues such as the regulation of
coastal real estate,7" a municipal imposition of a rent control
ordinance," and the use of punitive damages in tort judg-
ments.8 While the Court moved cautiously in dealing with
these issues, many of its members-in particular, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-consistently
showed an interest in elevating property rights above the lowly
status into which they had fallen following the crisis of legiti-
macy the Court suffered in the late 1930s.2 Indeed, if we ex-
" See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
"' See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Pennell v. San Jose,
485 U.S. 1 (1988).
"' See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (Oregon's procedure
denying appellate court review of punitive damages violates the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause).
82 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994) (Takings Clause
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amine the Olmstead-Katz-Soldal sequence of cases in light of a
larger trend in American constitutional law-a trend in which
property claims were ascendant until the late 1930s, then
subsequently fell into disrepute, and finally enjoyed modest
rehabilitation by the Rehnquist Court-we can see that Soldal
is part of a wide range of cases in which property interests
have gained new-found respect in the Court.
But we should not focus simply on the Rehnquist-Scalia-
Thomas wing of the Court in thinking about property interests.
Throughout his tenure on the Court, Justice Stevens, who has
never been identified with this wing, consistently had argued
that the Fourth Amendment provides independent protection
for property interests. It was Stevens's earlier pronouncements
on property that provided the foundation for the Court's con-
clusions in Soldal. In writing for a unanimous Court in Soldal,
Justice White prominently quoted Stevens's statement in
Jacobsen that a "'seizure' of property.., occurs [within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment] when 'there is some mean-
ingful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
that property."'83 Drawing on this statement, White wrote:
"We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of
one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be
viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the
Fourth Amendment."' White emphasized, of course, that this
did not mean that the Soldals' fourth amendment rights had
been violated.85 To find a fourth amendment violation, the
Court also would have had to conclude that the seizure of their
home had been unreasonable, an issue not before the Court
since it had granted certiorari merely to determine whether
the Fourth Amendment had been implicated by the deputies'
efforts to evict the Soldals from their home.
White might have concluded his opinion at this point. He
went on to argue, however, that prior Court decisions support-
ed his analysis of the case, stating that the message of Katz
and the cases following it was not that "the Fourth Amend-
should not be viewed as a poor stepchild of provisions such as the First and
Fourth Amendments).
' 113 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984)).
84 Id.
8, Id.
[Vol. 60: 633
1994] PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 653
ment is only marginally concerned with property rights [but
instead] ... that property rights are not the sole measure of
Fourth Amendment violations." 6 As should be clear, this is
not a wholly credible claim. In Oliver, for example, the Court
had declared that "[slince Katz... the touchstone of [Fourth]
Amendment analysis has been.., whether a person has a
'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.') 8 7 Given this statement, the most charitable characteriza-
tion that can be offered of White's Soldal review of prior cases
is that he resolved their ambiguities in favor of fourth amend-
ment property interests. White, it is fair to say, found a consis-
tency that had not been discernible in prior cases when he de-
clared in Soldal that property claims are cognizable under the
Fourth Amendment in the absence of privacy claims. 8
Can it be said, though, that in Soldal White was implicitly
concerned with privacy-in particular, with privacy-as-person-
al-solitude-since that case dealt with the government's sei-
zure of a home? The answer to this must be "no." While White
could have framed his argument in terms of privacy-as-person-
al-solitude, the text of his opinion makes it clear that he did
not reason from this perspective. Two features of White's opin-
ion are particularly relevant in this context. First, in Soldal,
White consistently focused on property interests as they stand
alone. He spoke, for example, of "pure property interests,"
asked whether possessory interests are protected by the Fourth
Amendment when privacy and liberty interests are not at
stake, and stated that it is untenable to conclude that "the
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures
only where privacy or liberty is also implicated."89 Second,
had White viewed the case through the prism of privacy-as-
personal-solitude, he would have asked questions about the
case's record-for example, whether the Soldals' solitude with-
in their home had been disrupted by the deputies' preparations
for the eviction, or whether the possibility of using their home
as a place for solitude had been impaired by the way in which
the trailer had been removed from its moorings and towed
, Id. at 544-45 (emphasis added).
87 466 U.S. at 177 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
113 S. Ct. at 544.
" Id. at 543 & 547 n.13.
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away-and then would have remanded the case in light of
those questions. Given these points, it is clear that White did
not think of privacy-as-personal-solitude as an informing prin-
ciple in resolving the case. Soldal thus stands for the proposi-
tion that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when there is a
seizure of property in the absence of a search of that property.
We can generalize on these points by saying that Soldal
posits three independently cognizable interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment-privacy, liberty and property. Katz
serves as an example of a pure privacy case (since it was con-
cerned with eavesdropping on phone conversations in a setting
where a suspect could claim no possessory interests). Garner
provides an example of a pure liberty case (since it was con-
cerned with the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon). And
Soldal completes the trinity by providing an example of a pure
property case. Needless to say, in most instances these inter-
ests do not stand alone. Searches can precede seizures; sei-
zures can precede searches. Thus, courts often must be sensi-
tive to the interplay of these interests.' ° What Soldal makes
clear, though, is that each interest can stand alone. Govern-
ment agents must be prepared to consider each interest in
isolation from the others.
A second general point is also worth noting. Given Soldal's
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment protects property inter-
ests independently of its protection of privacy and liberty inter-
ests, it is essential to ask what role other constitutional provi-
sions, such as the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause9 and
its Due Process Clause,92 play in protecting property. A case
the Court decided a year after Soldal, United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property,93 helps answer this question. At
stake in Good was the constitutionality of the government's ex
parte seizure of Good's home four years after he had entered a
guilty plea to drug charges following a warrant-based search of
" For further discussion of the significance of the interplay of Fourth Amend-
ment interests, see William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sion, 1989 WIsc. L. REv. 1193, 1220-28.
" The Takings Clause provides: 'nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 The Due Process clause provides: "nor [shall a person] be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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his home which led to the discovery of eighty-nine pounds of
marijuana. Good did not dispute the government's authority to
seize his home in an in rem proceeding, but argued instead
that an ex parte seizure so long after the entry of his guilty
plea was a violation of due process.94 The government in turn
claimed that the seizure was justified by Soldal. In particular,
it argued that the Due Process Clause had not been violated by
the ex parte seizure because the Fourth Amendment afforded
Good all the process he was due.95
In rejecting the government's argument, the Court held
that, under the circumstances, Good was entitled under the
Due Process Clause to more extensive protection than he was
under the Fourth Amendment." Quoting Soldal, it remarked:
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can
implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where
such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of iden-
tifying as a preliminary matter the claim's "dominant" character.
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn.97
In applying this framework, the Court held that, absent exi-
gent circumstances, a homeowner is entitled under the Due
Process Clause to notice and a hearing prior to a seizure of his
real property.9" Soldal, of course, established a lesser level of
property protection under the Fourth Amendment. Implicit in
Soldal, then, is the proposition that the Fourth Amendment
establishes a de minimis standard for the seizure of real es-
tate. The Due Process and Takings Clauses go beyond this.
When no exigent circumstance justifies the government's ac-
tions, individuals are entitled to protective, pre-seizure proce-
dures that minimize the risk of legally erroneous government
interference with their interests. The Fourth Amendment regu-
lates sudden, unexpected interventions in personal life (thus
its reference to a "right to be secure"); other constitutional
provisions are concerned with less disruptive ways of inter-
fering with property interests.
But while Soldal and Good, considered together, help to
" Id. at 498.
'5 Id. at 499.
" Id.
' Id. (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992)).
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 114 S. Ct. 492, 500-05
(1993).
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clarify the relationship between the different constitutional
provisions that deal with property, other questions about
fourth amendment property protection remain unresolved. In
the second half of this Article, I consider three Second Circuit
cases that have a bearing on the property/privacy relationship.
Here, I note some general questions, which have a bearing on
those cases, that can be raised in light of the Court's conclu-
sions in Soldal:
1. What Kinds of Property Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect?
In resolving Soldal, Justice White stated:
In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property
as such, we are mindful that the Amendment does not protect pos-
sessory interests in all kinds of property [citing Oliver's conclusion
that the Fourth Amendment offers no protection against trespassory
incursions into open fields]. This case, however, concerns a house,
which the Amendment's language explicitly includes, as it does a
person's effects."
One possible interpretation of this remark is that White be-
lieved that fourth amendment property protection is limited to
the items the amendment mentions-houses, papers and ef-
fects. However, if this is what White meant, it would be hard
to square Soldal with the interpretive framework the Court
employed in Katz. As I noted earlier, Katz repudiates Taft's
Olmstead conclusion that the amendment's reference to "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" is meant to be exhaustive. If
this were an exhaustive list, then conversations could not come
within the amendment's reach. Moreover, Katz also repudiates
Taft's conclusion that the amendment's list protects only tangi-
ble items, for conversations involve intangible sounds and
associated meanings. Each point is important in thinking
about Soldal's scope. If only the amendment's enumerated
items are protected, then it could be argued that the amend-
ment does not cover the seizure of automobiles and other
means of conveyance. If only tangible items come within its
scope, then one might argue that money is protected when it
exists as paper cash, but not when it exists as a credit on a
" 113 S. Ct. at 544 n.7.
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computer screen.
2. What Kinds of Property Relationships Does the Fourth
Amendment Protect?
Soldal dealt with the simplest kind of property relation-
ship: direct ownership of a tangible asset. Clearly, courts will
have to deal with more complex relationships in the future.
They will have to ask, for example, whether the Fourth
Amendment covers government interference in leasehold rela-
tionships and, if so, whether it protects the interests of lessors
and lessees. Or, to take another example, they will have to ask
whether the amendment covers bailment relationships and, if
so, whether it protects the interests of bailors and bailees. One
might argue that the amendment's reference to a "right... to
be secure" suggests that it is concerned only with the kinds of
sudden disruptions that interfere with the conduct of everyday
life. If so, one could argue that the amendment protects proper-
ty interests in which people exercise direct control over objects,
whether tangible or intangible (for example, one's luggage,
home and bank account) but that it does not protect property
interests when control is not essential to the conduct of every-
day life (for example, a lessor's or bailor's interest in property
that other people actually control).
3. What is the Status of Fourth Amendment
Property Interests?
With property interests now recognized as an independent
variable in fourth amendment analysis, courts must confront
two questions about the weight to accord them. First, courts
must consider whether probable cause or the lower standard,
reasonable suspicion,"0 should constitute the threshold for
legitimate interference with those interests. Second, courts
" The Supreme Court developed the reasonable suspicion standard in reviewing
seizures of the person. Its particular concern was with brief, forcible stops that do
not amount to an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In the final portion
of this Article, I suggest that the reasonable suspicion standard can be applied to
brief, forcible detentions of property. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text. I do not, however, argue that the standard should prevail for lengthy
deprivations of property.
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must also consider when a warrant should be required for
interference with those interests. As a general matter, courts
have accorded the greatest weight to privacy interests under
the Fourth Amendment, particularly privacy interests in the
home. In those cases, the courts have required probable cause
for entry into the home and, absent exigent circumstances, a
warrant for carrying out arrests and searches in the home.0 1
It is possible to imagine different weight being accorded to
different types of property interests, with the strongest weight
accorded to interests in the home and personal effects and less
weight accorded to interests in property that have a less
immediate impact on personal security.
4. What Remedial Response Should Courts Offer for
Violations of Fourth Amendment Property Interests?
In Gerstein v. Pugh,' the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment requires a prompt probable cause hearing by a
neutral magistrate following an individual's arrest. Recently,
the Court gave meaning to the term "prompt" by holding that
the government bears the burden of showing why it did not
provide a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of
arrest.0 3 Since arrests involve a seizure of the person, there
is an obvious analogy to Soldal's concern with seizures of prop-
erty. What is more, the venerable case of Weeks v. United
States' holds that the Fourth Amendment imposes a reme-
dial obligation on courts to order the prompt return of illegally
seized property. Thus, assuming that the return of property is
possible, it would seem that implicit in the Fourth Amendment
is a remedial mechanism that obligates the prompt return of
illegally seized property. Beyond this, if return is not possible
or the property has suffered damages, then courts can draw on
§ 1983 and Bivens, as in Soldal in granting monetary relief to
the victims of fourth amendment property wrongs.
.01 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
'0 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
10 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
Because Katz has so dominated recent discussion on the
Fourth Amendment, some time will be needed before courts
and commentators grasp the significance of the role Soldal
accorded property interests. In this Part, I offer a preliminary
assessment of Soldal's significance by analyzing three Second
Circuit cases in which property interests loom large. I begin
with United States v. Perea,0 5 a case in which the court con-
sidered the strength of a bailee's interest in property directly
under his control. I then turn to United States v. Daccarett,0 6
a complex asset forfeiture case that raises a number of difficult
property issues-among them, whether the Fourth Amendment
protects against the "seizure" of intangible assets such as com-
puterized bank accounts, and what procedures must be fol-
lowed for securing warrants to seize such property. Finally, I
turn to another forfeiture case, United States v. $37,780 in
U.S. Currency,0 7 which raises questions about the relevance
of suppression remedies in settings where government agents
are found to have seized assets illegally. None of the cases deal
with property interests as they stand alone. Rather, each goes
beyond Soldal by raising important questions about the inter-
play of privacy and property interests in fourth amendment
jurisprudence.
A. Perea and the Status of Bailments Under the Fourth
Amendment
Of the three cases under review, Perea raises particularly
vexing questions about the relationship between property and
privacy protection. At issue in Perea was the legitimacy of a
government seizure and subsequent search of a duffel bag that
another person had paid the defendant, Reuben Perea, to keep
for him (thus creating a bailor/bailee relationship).' ° While
conducting surveillance of a residence, government agents first
1- 986 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1993).
1w 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994).
920 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
... United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1993).
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observed someone who later turned out to be an associate of
Perea's-Herman Ortiz-as he left the building."9 On one of
the days they had the residence under surveillance, agents
noticed Ortiz arrive in a livery cab, enter the residence, and
exit shortly afterward with a duffel bag, which he placed in the
cab's trunk. Ortiz then returned to the building and, a few
minutes later, Perea came out and entered the cab.110 Each
man's comings and goings were marked by careful glances up
and down the street. Moreover, when Perea got into the cab,
he had his hand in his left pocket, leading an agent observing
him to think that he was keeping a gun there.1 '
Once the cab pulled away from the curb, agents followed
it. A number of government cars joined the pursuit and
stopped the cabs. What happened when the agents stopped the
cab was a subject of disagreement at Perea's suppression
hearing."2 Perea testified that a number of agents surround-
ed the cab. According to Perea, one of the surrounding agents
opened the door and pulled him out, searched him, and then
pushed him down against the ground. In the meantime, Perea
testified, other agents took the duffel bag from the trunk,
though they never asked him whether the bag belonged to him.
At the suppression hearing, Perea testified that someone else
had paid him to keep the bag. Perea also stated that he knew
the bag contained marijuana, cocaine and a scale and that, on
the day in question, Ortiz had told him to move it to another
location.'
At the suppression hearing, one of the government's
agents, Brian Aryai, stated that he had simply asked Perea to
leave the cab while another agent stated that he could not
recall exactly how Perea had been made to exit the cab. 4
After he had taken the duffel bag from the trunk, Aryai also
testified that he had asked Perea whether the bag was his and
that Perea had responded, "No, that's not my bag." 5 After
opening the bag and discovering the drugs it contained, the
'0' Id. at 635-36.
110 Id. at 636.
11 Id.
112 Id.
113 Perea, 986 F.2d at 636.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 636-37.
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agents placed Perea under arrest and read him his Miranda
warnings. Aryai testified that, during a later interrogation,
Perea stated that he had concealed money in the back seat of
the cab. A search of the back seat area led to the discovery of
about $13,000 in cash."6
If nothing else, Perea provides a telling reminder of the
confusing jumble of facts trial courts often have to confront
when conducting suppression hearings. In passing on Perea's
motion to suppress the contents of the duffel bag, the state-
ments made to Aryai, and the cash discovered as a result of
those statements, Judge Korman, of the Eastern District of
New York, held as an initial matter that Perea had standing to
challenge the agents' forcible stop of the cab even though he
was only a passenger in it." 7 Korman declined to decide
whether the force the agents used was so great as to constitute
an arrest.18 Because "nothing followed from the alleged use
of excessive force," Korman reasoned, there was no need to
pass on the issue of arrest; rather, he concluded, it was enough
to hold that reasonable suspicion justified the agents' stop of
the cab.'
Judge Korman then turned to the evidence Perea wished
to have suppressed. He ruled that, as a passenger in the cab,
Perea had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of its trunk and so could not object to a search of it.' ° More-
over, Korman stated that since Perea claimed to be only a
temporary custodian of the duffel bag, he had not asserted
"any facts remotely suggesting that he had any expectation of
privacy in [the bags] contents.""2' As for the statements and
money discovered, Korman held that they had been properly
obtained since the agents' search of the bag had provided prob-
able cause for arresting Perea."' Perea ultimately entered a
conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute narcotics,
thus setting the stage for his appeal of the denial of his sup-
116 Id. at 637.
117 Id.
n Perea, 986 F.2d at 637.
" Id. at 638.
120 Id.
121 Id.
" Id. at 638.
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pression motion.'23
In a thoughtful, meticulous opinion for a unanimous panel,
Judge Kearse reversed the judgment of conviction against
Perea.'24 The facts relevant to the suppression motion were
so complex that Kearse worked cautiously through the case,
instructing the district court to consider a number of different
possibilities on remand.'25 But while Kearse was properly
cautious in approaching the case, one must ask whether she
was sufficiently sensitive to the issues that arise when some-
one claims only to be a bailee of a given piece of property. As
Kearse recognized, the critical question for Perea was whether
he could claim, as only a bailee, a privacy interest in the con-
tents of the duffel bag.2 6  If he could not, then the
government's search of it was proper, and his subsequent ar-
rest (for possession of a controlled substance) was lawful as
well. By contrast, if one were to hold that the government had
only reasonable suspicion to stop Perea and that Perea had a
privacy interest in the contents of the duffel bag, one could
then argue that no probable cause existed for his arrest (since
the contents of the duffel bag could not be used to justify his
arrest). It would follow that the statements he had given to the
police had been illegally obtained and that the money discov-
ered on the basis of those statements had been illegally seized.
Judge Kearse's conclusion that Perea could claim a privacy
interest in the contents of the bag was based on a key passage
in then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Rakas v.
Illinois:"'
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to prop-
erty is the right to exclude others [Rehnquist cited Blackstone on
this point], and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls prop-
erty will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by
virtue of this right to exclude.'28
12 Perea, 986 F.2d at 639.
124 Id.
1 Id. at 645.
121 Id. at 639-40.
121 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
' Id. at 143-44 n.12 (emphasis added).
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The general tenor of these remarks is that one of the ways to
justify a claim to a fourth amendment privacy interest is to
show that the law recognizes a property interest in a given
object. As the italicized portion of the quotation makes clear,
however, this is not an invariably successful mode of justifica-
tion. The Court's holding in Oliver illustrates this point, for
while Oliver had a "right to exclude others" from his open
fields, the Court held that since open fields are not the setting
for "intimate activities," he did not have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in them.129 As a general matter, then, we can
say that a legally protected property interest generates a pri-
vacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment when the
person claiming the property interest can show that he would
benefit in his personal (i.e., private) life from exercising the
property interest. Thus a homeowner or a lessee of an apart-
ment could claim a privacy interest by showing a property
interest in a specific piece of real estate. By contrast, to draw
on the example Oliver provides, neither an owner nor a lessee
of an open field can claim a privacy interest in it despite their
property interest in such a field.
In resolving Perea, Judge Kearse simply held that since
Perea, as bailee of the duffel bag, had a right to exclude others
from the bag, he had a privacy interest in its contents. But
clearly, this will not do, for Perea could not claim that, as the
bag's bailee, he was in a position to benefit in his private life
from excluding others from it. Does this mean that Perea did
not have a privacy interest in the contents of the bag? The
answer to this is that he might have had such an inter-
est-that the outcome of a privacy claim depended on the
terms of his bailment. As a matter of law, bailments are con-
tractual relationships. 3 ' In any bailment of a sealed contain-
er, a bailee may or may not have a contractual right to exam-
ine the contents of what it is he has contracted to handle. If a
bailee does have such a right-for example, if a bailor instructs
a bailee to inspect the contents of a bag periodically to make
sure everything is all right-then the bailee has a privacy
interest in the bag's contents, an interest based not on the
1" Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
... See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F.2d 417, 418-19 (4th Cir.
1927).
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principle that sustains privacy claims in homes or apartments
but instead on a principle that is concerned with the sharing of
information for business purposes against outsiders. On the
other hand, if a bailee does not have a right of inspection-for
example, if a bailor hands over a bag with firm instructions
that the bailee deliver it to a specified recipient without in-
specting it-then the bailee does not have a privacy interest in
the bag's contents. Accordingly, the key point Perea should
have been required to establish on remand was that his bail-
ment agreement authorized him to inspect the bag's contents.
This point is critical despite the fact that Perea testified at the
suppression hearing that he "knew" what the bag contained.
That statement, standing alone, could mean nothing more than
that he had heard a rumor about the bag's contents and that
he believed this rumor even though he had been told not to
look inside the bag. Kearse thus correctly held that a bailee
can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of
a bailed article. Given the factual record before her, however,
she was not entitled to assume that Perea actually had such
an interest in the duffel bag seized by government agents.
These comments are significant, of course, only if the gov-
ernment agents did not have probable cause to arrest Perea
prior to their inspection of the bag. Judge Kearse agreed with
the district court's conclusion that the encounter with Perea
began as a forcible stop rather than as an arrest.13' If the
government agents did not have probable cause to arrest Perea
before opening the bag, the case would have to be resolved
solely in light of the bailment issues just discussed. However,
since the officers might have gained probable cause to arrest
Perea between the time of the stop and the time of the bag's
inspection, Kearse had to allow for the possibility of a valid
search of the bag even though Perea had a privacy interest in
its contents. Kearse noted, for example, that assuming proba-
ble cause for arrest, the government might be able to justify
the agents' search of the bag on the ground that its contents
would inevitably have been discovered during the course of an
inventory search.'32 The complexity of the case thus made it
necessary for her to pose multiple questions on remand. It is
"' Perea, 986 F.2d at 644.
132 Id.
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unfortunate she did not recognize that one of them should
have been the nature of the bailment relationship Perea had
formed on assuming responsibility for the duffel bag.
B. Daccarett and the Strength of Property Interests Protected
by the Fourth Amendment
Perhaps the most important question left unanswered in
Soldal is whether property interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment are entitled to the same degree of protection as
privacy and liberty interests. This question can rarely be posed
in its pure form since property is usually seized through gov-
ernment penetration of some kind of privacy arrangement.
What is more, property seizures are often preceded by interfer-
ence with a liberty interest-by an arrest or a forcible stop, for
example. These intertwinings of property with privacy and
liberty interests were present in United States v. Daccarett.33
However, because the arrests at stake in the case took place on
foreign soil and the measures the government used in pene-
trating privacy arrangements were held not to be actionable
under the Fourth Amendment, the case turned out to be one in
which fourth amendment property claims stood on their
own.' Daccarett thus offers a particularly interesting way of
thinking about Soldal's significance.
At issue in Daccarett was the lawfulness of a series of
government seizures of funds that were to be temporarily held
by American banks in anticipation of their transfer to Colombi-
an banks.3 ' The triggering event for the case was a wiretap
by members of the Luxembourg Surete, one of which was
placed on the telephone of Jose Franklin Jurado-Rodriguez
during a trip he made to Luxembourg in late 1989. While mon-
itoring Jurado's phone conversations, the police overheard him
engage in discussions with Jose Santacruz Londono, widely
believed to be the leader of the Cali drug syndicate.' Jurado
informed Londono that he had opened bank accounts in Europe
in the name of Londono's father-in-law and that he was plan-
6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
,3' Id. at 59.
5 Id. at 44.
121 United States v. All Funds on Deposit, 801 F. Supp. 984, 988 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
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ning to set up shell corporations which could aid in money
laundering. 137 Using wire and fax-taps, the Luxembourg po-
lice also learned that a Jurado associate, Edgar Alberto Garcia-
Montilla, was opening bank accounts in the name of Londono's
parents-in-law.13
After Jurado, Garcia and another associate had traveled
throughout northern Europe, opening bank accounts in Bel-
gium, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, they
were arrested upon their return to Luxembourg. 39 Jurado
and Garcia were subsequently convicted in Luxembourg on
money-laundering charges. More importantly however, officials
discovered address books and an operating plan for a money-
laundering scheme in Jurado's and Garcia's possession at the
time of their arrest.4 ' In drawing on this information, law
enforcement officials seized millions of dollars held in bank ac-
counts world-wide. In all, more than thirty million dollars in
Europe, sixteen million dollars in Panama, and twelve million
dollars in the United States were seized.'
The American asset seizures, the legality of which was the
central issue in Daccarett, did not involve tangible cash. Rath-
er, the seizures concerned electronic funds transfers ("EFTs")
of assets that, as noted, were designated for deposit in Colom-
bian bank accounts. Issuing oral orders and arrest war-
rants in rem, government officials told American banks to
attach all funds on deposit in the names of individuals whose
identities they had discovered through the documents seized
when Jurado and Garcia were arrested."' However, because
even this information was only fragmentary, the government's
agents issued new warrants that were based on facts they
subsequently discovered through enforcement of the initial
warrants. To gain further information, government agents also
issued subpoenas to the banks requiring them to provide finan-
cial records for the accounts named in the original and subse-
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 993.
141 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 44.
142 Id. at 43.
143 Id. at 44.
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quent warrants. " The assets seized were eventually trans-
ferred to the clerk of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, who held them pending disposi-
tion of the forfeiture action the government brought concerning
the funds.'45
The forfeiture action brought in Daccarett was an in rem
civil proceeding. Therefore, the nominal defendants were the
offending funds themselves, whose forfeiture the government
sought because they allegedly had been used to further a mas-
sive conspiracy to import drugs. Civil forfeiture, however, often
has a criminal flavor.' Despite the formal designation of
some specific item-such as a financial asset or a home-as
the offending party, civil forfeiture is often used as part of a
battery of legal devices that further prosecution of criminal
enterprises. This was certainly true in Daccarett given the
government's allegations that the Cali drug syndicate con-
trolled the bank accounts that had been seized. What gave the
case its special character, however, was the consistently differ-
ent story the claimants told about the money. In all, eighteen
claimants stepped forward to contest different seizures."'
The claimants portrayed themselves as Colombian apparel
manufacturers who received cash upon sending their products
abroad. In offering this account, the claimants not only chal-
lenged the government's forfeiture action, they also brought a
counterclaim seeking damages for what they alleged to be
violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). In related
actions, they sued both the American banks that had complied
with the in rem warrants and the U.S. Attorneys who had
ordered the funds seized. Judge Weinstein, the trial judge in
the case, granted summary judgment for the banks and dis-
144 Id.
145 Id.
See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993) ("forfeiture
generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been un-
derstood, at least in part, as punishment"); see also Halper v. United States, 490
U.S. 435, 448 (1989) ("a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the
term").
147 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 43.
" Id. at 44.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
missed the case against the U.S. Attorneys for failure to state
a claim on which relief could be based.'
As for the forfeiture action itself, a magistrate judge held
an ex parte, in camera proceeding on May 13, 1991, about ten
months after the seizures had been effected, in which he deter-
mined there was probable cause to believe that the funds were
the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and/or money launder-
ing.5 ' Shortly afterward, Judge Weinstein held an evidentia-
ry hearing at which he concluded there was probable cause to
believe the funds were forfeitable.'5' A two-month jury trial
was held in early 1992. The jury found for three of the claim-
ants, concluding in two instances that the assets seized from
their accounts were not traceable to either drug trafficking or
money laundering, and concluding in a third instance that one
of the claimants was an innocent owner.'52 On appeal, the
unsuccessful claimants argued that the warrants authorizing
the seizures had been defective and that the evidence in the
case thus should have been suppressed.53
Judge Pratt, a member of the Second Circuit who has
shown particular interest in asset forfeiture cases, wrote an
opinion for a unanimous panel upholding the trial court's judg-
ment."'54 Because of the complexity of the issues he had to ad-
dress, it is best to consider Pratt's opinion in stages. The first
stage will have to do with liberty and privacy issues. After
that, I will turn to the many different questions Pratt's opinion
raises about the protection of property interests.
1. The Absence of Cognizable Liberty and Privacy Claims
in Daccarett
At the outset, it should be noted that no fourth amend-
ment liberty claims were before the court. Although the
government's case depended on information discovered through
the seizure of documents in the possession of Jurado and Gar-
cia at the time they were arrested, those arrests were not at
"I Id. at 44-45.
150 Id. at 45.
151 Id.
152 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 45.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 59.
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issue since they had been carried out by foreign police on for-
eign soil.'55 By contrast, the Daccarett claimants did raise of
number of privacy issues, but Judge Pratt conclud-
ed-correctly, I believe-that none of their claims was legally
cognizable.'56
First, the claimants argued that the subpoenas issued for
the financial records held by American banks violated their
fourth amendment rights.'57 In responding to this, Pratt not-
ed that the Supreme Court has consistently held that bank
customers have no fourth amendment privacy interest in the
contents of the records retained by their banks. At most, Pratt
noted, the Fourth Amendment guards against "'too much in-
definiteness or breadth"' in subpoenas for bank records, and
this, he held, had not been a defect of the Daccarett subpoe-
nas.
5 8
Second, the claimants also argued that they had a statuto-
rily protected privacy interest in their bank records under the
Right to Financial Privacy Act.'59 Judge Pratt, however, held
that this act protects only accounts held in customers'
names. 6 Since the claimants did not hold EFTs in their own
names, they were not, Pratt concluded, protected by the
act.
161
Finally, the claimants maintained that the EFTs were pro-
tected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
that the information gained from the EFTs thus should have
been suppressed.'62 Judge Pratt's response to this was that
"no 'device' was used to obtain the information as contemplated
by the ECPA" and that the act therefore did not come into
play.163
... Id. at 44.
.. Id. at 50.
' Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 50.
... Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1976)).
1' 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1978).
' 6 F.3d at 50-52.
1" Id.
2 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
" 6 F.3d at 53-54.
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2. Fourth Amendment Property Interests
What about the claimants' property interests in the assets
seized? One might argue that the Fourth Amendment does not
cover the seizure of an intangible res such as a computerized
bank account and that the claimants thus were also without
fourth amendment protection for their property interests.
While Judge Pratt did not address this issue, one can make
sense of his approach to the case only by concluding that he
assumed that the Fourth Amendment did offer protection in
this respect. We should consider first this threshold question
about fourth amendment property protection and then turn to
the specific property issues at stake in the case.
a. The Fourth Amendment's Applicability
to Intangible Bank Assets
It is somewhat surprising that Judge Pratt did not address
the basic question of whether the Fourth Amendment offers
protection for a party's interest in an intangible res such as a
bank account. In posing this question, we should recall that in
Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft suggested that the Fourth
Amendment's coverage does not extend beyond tangible
items.164 Taft's point cannot be completely dismissed: for ex-
ample, it certainly would be inappropriate to say that an in-
tangible res such as a copyright or a patent can be "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But cash is
different. Since tangible cash (the kind of cash carried in a
wallet, for example) can of course be seized within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, it would be anomalous to say that
intangible cash (the kind held in a computerized bank) is not
subject to fourth amendment protection. Each kind of cash can
readily be converted into the other, so one would not come to
terms with the practices of everyday life if one said that a
seizure occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when government agents confiscate money that someone is
about to deposit in an automatic teller machine but that the
Fourth Amendment becomes irrelevant if, say, ten seconds
after the deposit, government agents freeze an account which
... See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
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was just credited with a deposit of physical cash. Clearly, Pratt
should have confronted directly a question as basic as this. In
his defense, however, one can at least say that he correctly as-
sumed that the Fourth Amendment comes into play when
government officials instruct bank officers to freeze an account.
b. The Fourth Amendment's Applicability to the
Statutorily Specified Procedures Employed
in Seizing Computerized Bank Assets
As Judge Pratt noted, the government has three options in
carrying out such seizures."' First, in the food and drug laws
Congress has authorized in rem seizures provided those sei-
zures adhere to procedures specified in the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.'66 Second,
the Government can employ the procedures set out in Rule
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which re-
quire that a judicial officer determine ex parte whether there is
probable cause to carry out a seizure.'67 And third, govern-
ment officials can carry out warrantless seizures when, as the
food and drug laws state, "the Attorney General has probable
cause to believe that the property [to be seized] is subject to
civil forfeiture." 6 ' Only the first and third options were at
stake in Daccarett. As Pratt pointed out, neither requires "pre-
seizure judicial approval:" the first follows a process in which a
clerk issues a warrant upon receipt of a government complaint,
while the third of course requires no warrant at all.'69
In analyzing the asset seizures in Daccarett, Judge Pratt
distinguished between those that were the culmination of what
we can call a rolling warrant process and those that were
not. "'70 Under a rolling warrant process, the government peri-
odically revises already-issued in rem warrants to take into
account new information it has discovered through, among
other things, the administration of previous warrants. As I
noted in discussing Daccarett's facts, the government's initial
' 6 F.3d at 46.
I" See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
1c7 FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(c).
21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1988).
19 6 F.3d at 46.
170 Id. at 47-48.
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seizures in the case were based on fragmentary information
about the EFTs passing through American banks. The govern-
ment supplemented this information by issuing subpoenas for
bank records and by then issuing new warrants that were
based in part on facts discovered through the issuance of the
subpoenas and in part on facts discovered through administra-
tion of the prior warrants. Given this background, Pratt con-
cluded that the seizures made at the conclusion of the rolling
warrant process had to be classified as warrantless ones.171
He further concluded that the seizures could be justified on
fourth amendment grounds as exceptions to the amendment's
warrant requirement since exigent circumstances required
prompt government action to seize the EFTs.'72
Judge Pratt was certainly wise not to argue that the roll-
ing warrant process can be justified as a proper instance of a
warrant-based intrusion. If the government were allowed to
use vague, nonparticularized warrants to secure information
and if it then were further allowed to use the information so
acquired to produce warrants that particularly describe what is
to be seized, then the warrant requirement-indeed, the
Fourth Amendment's general premise that the government
must possess particularized information of wrongdoing before
intervening-would be eviscerated. But given this point, one
must ask whether Pratt simply used a definitional sleight-of-
hand to evade the Fourth Amendment's requirements; that is,
one must ask whether a reclassification of the seizures as
warrantless still leaves them invalid since they were based on
information gained in part through warrants that were not
sufficiently particularized to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
The answer to this is that it appears he did. The warrants that
started the rolling process stated only that banks were to
freeze "all funds on deposit in [any account of] Jose Santacruz-
Londono" and also "all related entities and individuals."173 It
is possible, of course, that the government had probable cause
at the time these initial warrants were issued to seize funds in
the accounts of "all related entities and individuals."'74 If it
171 Id.
172 Id. at 49-50.
17 Id. at 44.
174 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 44.
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did, then the initial seizures were justified and the information
gained through the warrants and subpoenas simply provided
further support for them. On the other hand, if the government
did not have probable cause at the time of the initial warrants,
then relabeling the seizures "warrantless" does not help in
justifying them. Judge Pratt's opinion is not entirely clear on
this point.7 1 Thus, only a conditional statement is warranted
here: If the government had not met the probable cause
threshold at the time it seized the funds of "all related entities
and individuals," then its seizure of those funds was ille-
gal. 7
6
Let us turn now to the seizures that were not based on the
rolling warrant process-that is, the seizures that, in Judge
Pratt's words, "were preceded by a complaint and arrest war-
rant that explicitly named the intended beneficiary." 77 For
these seizures, Pratt advanced no exigent circumstances justifi-
cation, and we should thus assume that none existed. Rather,
he claimed simply that the seizures complied with the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirements and so should be up-
held. 7 1 Unfortunately, his argument on this score was under-
mined by two mischaracterizations of the relevant law at
stake. Once we correct his mischaracterizations, we will be
able to see why he erred in upholding the warrant-based sei-
zures.
Judge Pratt's first misstep was to speak of a fourth
amendment requirement of a judicial determination of proba-
ble cause prior to the issuance of a warrant. 7 1 Under the
Supplemental Admiralty Rules, a court clerk must issue an in
rem warrant "forthwith" once government officials file a com-
plaint that property is forfeitable for a federal statutory viola-
tion.' In analyzing these rules, Pratt focused on the
.7 Judge Pratt stated that government officials "knew that Santacruz-
Londono . . . would probably be directing the transfer of illicit income through
particular New York banks to the accounts of several of his 'businesses' in Colom-
bia". Id. at 48. This statement, however, hardly demonstrates that government
officials had probable cause with respect to each and every account subjected to a
warrantless seizure.
176 Id. at 47.
277 6 F.3d at 47.
178 Id. at 49.
173 Id. at 49-50.
183 See SuPP. A.M.C. R.C.(3).
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judiciary's role in seizures and held that a prior judicial de-
termination is not required for a seizure.18' This, however,
was not the critical issue posed by the Rules. As the Supreme
Court has made clear, the key point that must be considered in
thinking about the warrant issuance process is not whether a
judge or some official makes a probable cause determination,
rather, the key point is that, whoever the official making the
determination, that official must act in a neutral and detached
manner."8 2 On this count, the Supplemental Rules are clearly
defective. They require a clerk to issue an in rem warrant
"forthwith" on receiving a government complaint that property
is statutorily forfeitable.' Had Pratt identified the issue cor-
rectly here-had he focused on the problem of neutral and
detached assessment-he would also have detected the fourth
amendment problem with the warrant procedure prescribed by
the Supplemental Rules.
In compounding this misstep, Judge Pratt also changed
the focus of his inquiry about the Supplemental Rules from the
Fourth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. How he did so is discernible in a remarkable passage
in which he began by discussing fourth amendment require-
ments for issuing warrants and then moved, without acknowl-
edgement, to fifth amendment standards for forfeiture sei-
zures. Pratt remarked:
[T]he fourth amendment mandates the existence of probable cause
at the time of seizure. However, the government need not obtain a
judicial determination of probable cause prior to seizure. While
181 6 F.3d at 47.
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), a unanimous Court
rejected the notion that "all warrant authority must reside exclusively in a lawyer
or a judge." Id. at 349. The Court held that "an issuing magistrate must meet two
tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining
whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest of search." Id. at 350.
There is little doubt that an in rem clerk could meet Shadwick's capacity test; in
Shadwick, the Court was prepared to "presume from the nature of the clerk's
position [in that case] that he would be able to deduce from the facts on an affi-
davit before him whether there was probable cause." Id. at 351. The defect with
the in rem warrant process thus lies in the neutrality requirement: when a clerk
is required to issue a warrant "forthwith" on receiving an application from govern-
ment officials, one can hardly say that the clerk has the requisite neutrality under
Shadwick's test. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979);
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
" Supp. R. C(3)
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"absent an 'extraordinary situation' a party cannot invoke the power
of the state to seize a person's property without a prior judicial de-
termination that the seizure is justified", the Supreme Court has
held that "such an extraordinary situation exists when the govern-
ment seizes items subject to forfeiture.""8 4
In "unpacking" these remarks, we should initially note that the
first two sentences contain Pratt's mischaracterization of the
fourth amendment issue central to in rem warrants-that is,
Pratt focuses here on whether a judge or nonjudicial officer
should make a probable cause determination when the key
issue is whether a reviewing officer (perhaps a judge, perhaps
not) has assessed a warrant application from a neutral and de-
tached perspective. Whatever their other defects, though, the
first two sentences are at least about the Fourth Amendment
(which is as it should be since Pratt had entitled the subsec-
tion in which they are contained "Fourth Amendment Con-
cerns.")."8 5 By contrast, in the third and longest sentence of
the passage, Pratt draws not on fourth amendment but on fifth
amendment due process cases dealing with asset forfei-
tures."8 6 His fifth amendment references are particularly jar-
ring in this context since pre-seizure hearings under the Due
Process Clause are adversarial in nature while the most the
Fourth Amendment requires is an ex parte hearing prior to
seizure. The passage thus has a disorienting effect on the read-
er, making it unclear exactly what Pratt had in mind when he
wrote it.
In trying to offer some kind of defense for Judge Pratt,
could one argue that, while he of course should not have moved
without acknowledgement from the Fourth to the Fifth Amend-
ment, his conclusions can indeed be upheld on fifth amend-
ment grounds once those grounds are made explicit? The an-
swer to this is that a fifth amendment analysis might at one
time have provided a plausible justification for a clerk's sum-
mary issuance of an in rem warrant but that Soldal,8 7 which
the Supreme Court decided four months before the Second
18 6 F.3d at 50 (quoting United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and
Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983)); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
18 Id. at 48-50.
18 Id. at 50.
8 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
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Circuit heard oral argument in Daccarett, made this line of
defense for Pratt's conclusions untenable. We have already
considered Soldal's admonition that when multiple constitu-
tional provisions cover a certain kind of governmental activity,
courts are obligated to consider all the provisions relevant to
that activity."' 8 This admonition in Soldal is worth quoting
again, however, given its relevance to Pratt's remarks. The
Soldal Court remarked:
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can
implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where
such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of iden-
tifying as a preliminary matter the claim's "dominant" character.
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn.'
Given this analysis, one cannot save Pratt's conclusions by
arguing that the "dominant" character of the in rem warrant
process made it appropriate to analyze that process under the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Instead, Soldal obligat-
ed Pratt to consider the Fourth Amendment as well, and had
he characterized properly the fourth amendment problem
posed by the in rem warrant process (i.e., the absence of neu-
tral and detached inspection by the clerk issuing the warrant),
he would have seen that it is a substantial one indeed. But one
further defense of Pratt's conclusions must be considered now
that the questions connected with the issuance of in rem war-
rants have been properly stated. In defending Pratt's conclu-
sion, one might argue that, while the Fourth Amendment gen-
erally requires a neutral and detached assessment of probable
cause prior to the issuance of a warrant, it does not require
this when property interests alone are at stake. Liberty and
privacy interests, it could be argued, are entitled to enhanced
fourth amendment protection. Thus, one could claim that while
neutral and detached assessment is required for the issuance
of warrants affecting those interests, the in rem process pre-
scribed by the Supplemental Rules suffices when property
interests alone are implicated.
I noted earlier that the Soldal Court did not address this
question directly. 9 ' But while it did not, it did go out of its
188 Id. at 548.
19 Id.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
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way to emphasize that property seizures must be considered
within the general context of the Fourth Amendment's concern
with personal security. The Soldal Court remarked:
In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effec-
tuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question of
whether the [Fourth] Amendment applies. What matters [in deter-
mining whether it applies] is the intrusion on the people's security
from governmental interference.'9'
In this passage, the Court quite clearly suggests that both
entrance into a home (an activity that affects privacy interests)
and effectuation of a seizure (an activity that affects property
interests) are significant because they intrude on individual
security. The Court does not distinguish between the gravity of
these different kinds of intrusions; rather, it states that the
aim of the Fourth Amendment is to protect each facet of that
security.'92 Besides finding support in Soldal, this parity-of-
interests thesis can be sustained on its own terms. An
individual's sense of personal security is critically grounded in
his capacity to control his possessions from arbitrary govern-
mental interference. Personal security is affected not only by
indiscriminate wiretapping and forcible stops but also by indis-
criminate seizures of property. A requirement of neutral and
detached assessment of warrant applications furthers this per-
sonal interest by reducing the likelihood of erroneous interfer-
ence with property interests. The property-is-less-important
defense thus cannot be sustained. In turn, this means that
Pratt's conclusions concerning the in rem warrant process are
without constitutional support.
Judge Pratt's approach to the warrant process becomes
even more perplexing once one takes into account the general
misgivings he expressed about forfeiture proceedings near the
end of his Daccarett opinion. There, he stated:
Despite [the] apparent unfairness [of civil forfeiture procedures], the
precedents of this court and the Supreme Court, as well as the rele-
vant statutes and rules, seem to require [harsh] result[s]. At this
point in the development of forfeiture law, any change in the bal-
ance of this unique procedural system must come either from the
Id. at 548.
192 Id.
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Supreme Court or from [C]ongress.' 9'
The concern Pratt expressed in this passage stands in stark
contrast with the tortured reasoning he followed in upholding
the constitutionality of the in rem warrants. Had he not
mischaracterized the issues at stake in the in rem warrant
process, he could readily have discerned the basis Soldal pro-
vides for challenging the warrant process outlined in the Sup-
plemental Rules.
C. United States v. $37,780 in United States Currency and the
Question of the Appropriate Remedy for an Illegal Seizure
Daccarett focuses on whether seizures of property comply
with the Fourth Amendment. The final case under review,
United States v. $37,780 in United States Currency,94 raises
questions about the remedial steps courts should take on find-
ing that the government failed to comply with the amendment.
Stated in this way, the issue of a remedy seems simple. The
government, it can be said, should return illegally seized prop-
erty, just as it should release someone who has been illegally
arrested. However, United States v. $37,780 takes us one step
beyond this, for the case requires us to consider whether an
order of return is the appropriate judicial response when the
government is later able to justify a seizure that was illegal at
the time it was made.'95 This before/after problem is critical
to the Fourth Amendment. As I have suggested, the amend-
ment is grounded in the premise that the government must
meet a given threshold of suspicion before it interferes with
the interests it protects. United States v. $37,780 provides us
with an opportunity to consider what should be done when
subsequently discovered evidence indicates that an intrusion
would have been appropriate in the first place.
The facts in United States v. $37,780 are straightforward.
When Victorino Hernandez placed his attache case under the
X-ray scanner at the Buffalo airport in anticipation of boarding
a flight to New York, security officers determined, on examin-
ing their scanner screen, that the attache case was filled with
193 6 F.3d at 56.
114 920 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
19 Id. at 160-61.
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cash.'96 The officers asked Hernandez to open his case. He
complied, and on inspecting it, the officers discovered $37,780
in cash, most of it in denominations of $20 or less. Asked to ex-
plain why he was carrying so much cash, Hernandez stated
that his mother had given him the money and that he was
taking it to New York to open a restaurant. Hernandez also
claimed to be an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
though he added that the money in his possession belonged to
him, not to the agency. Moreover, in stating that his mother
had given him the money, he first said that she had sent him a
check, which he had cashed, and later contradicted this by
saying that she had brought him the money from the Domini-
can Republic. Finally, Herndandez claimed that the woman,
Linda Matias, who drove him to airport was someone he did
not know very well. 97
Government officials did not arrest Hernandez. However,
they did seize the money he was carrying.9 ' On looking into
Hernandez's story, they discovered that he was not a DEA
employee, that he had been convicted on four felony drug
charges, that he and Matias apparently were living together,
and that both were under investigation for drug activities. The
DEA then instituted an administrative forfeiture proceeding
against the money seized.'99 When Hernandez filed a claim
for the money, the government began a civil in rem forfeiture
action in federal district court against the currency. 0'
Hernandez's argument in challenging the forfeiture action was
simplicity itself. The government, he claimed, did not have
probable cause at the time of the seizure to take his proper-
ty.2O' Whatever evidence the government had gathered after
the seizure, Hernandez argued, could not be used to satisfy the
government's burden of proof in the forfeiture proceeding.
Thus, he claimed, the trial court should dismiss the forfeiture
and return the money to him."2
In countering Hernadez's arguments, the government
"o Id. at 160.
197 Id. at 161.
19 Id.
10 United States v. $37,780, 920 F.2d at 161.
200 Id.
201 Id.
20 Id.
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claimed that it did in fact have probable cause to seize the
money at the airport. Alternatively, however, the government
suggested that, whatever the resolution of the probable cause
issue arising with respect to the airport seizure, it clearly had
enough evidence to satisfy the probable cause standard that
prevails at probable cause forfeiture proceedings." 3 This al-
ternative argument, it should be noted, goes to the heart of the
before/after problem. The same standard-probable
cause-=governs both seizures and the government's burden of
proof at forfeiture proceedings. While the government conceded
it might not have met this standard at the time of the seizure,
it claimed that it was indeed able to meet this at the time of
the forfeiture proceeding."4 Because Hernandez advanced no
further claims concerning the property (he argued that he
should prevail because the money had been illegally seized and
did not further argue that the money was not traceable to
illegal activity), the government contended that the money was
properly forfeitable under either its first or second probable
cause claims.0 5
The trial judge, John Elfvin, disagreed with the
government's arguments. First, he rejected the "after" compo-
nent of the government's before/after contentions by holding
that the forfeiture could be justified only on a showing that
there was probable cause to seize the money."' Second,
Elfvin held that the government had not met this stan-
dard-that is, he held that the government did not have proba-
ble cause to take the money during the airport encounter.0 '
And third, he held that because the "mere exclusion of uncon-
stitutionally seized property from a contested proceeding for its
forfeiture is of no practical effect," the money should not sim-
ply be suppressed but instead returned to Hernandez, with the
government prohibited from seeking its forfeiture again.0 '
This final point needs elaboration. In the Second Circuit, the
suppression of illegally seized property does not necessarily
203 Id. at 161-62.
204 United States v. $37,780, 920 F.2d at 162.
205 Id.
206 United States v. $37,780 in United States Currency, No. CIV-89-743E, 1989
WL 132005 at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1989).
207 Id.
218 Id. at *3
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lead to the termination of forfeiture proceedings, for as long as
the government is able to provide probable cause by drawing
on evidence untainted by the original wrong, it can satisfy its
burden of proof."9 The government's alternative argument in
United States v. $37,780 rested on just this point-that is, it
claimed that it was able to satisfy by untainted evidence its
probable cause burden in the forfeiture proceeding and that it
thus should prevail.210 Anticipating this point, Judge Elfvin
stated that a harsher deterrent than suppression was required.
It is for this reason that he ordered the property's return and
issued a further order prohibiting the government from
reinstituting forfeiture proceedings.21'
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Pratt reversed
Elfvin's judgment, holding that while the currency had indeed
been illegally seized, the government could (and did) sustain
its burden in the forfeiture proceeding by drawing on subse-
quently secured evidence untainted by the original wrong.2"2
On the question of illegal seizure, Pratt noted the possibility
that courts might reason in terms of a rebuttable presumption
of illegal possession when individuals are found to be carrying
large amounts of cash.213 Pratt, however, did not press this
point. He assumed for purposes of the opinion that the seizure
had been illegal and so reasoned in terms of an illegal "before"
component of the before/after equation.2 4 Given this conclu-
sion, Pratt might of course have gone a step further and held
that the money seized ceased to exist as far as the forfeiture
proceeding was concerned. He avoided this approach, however,
and although he did not state his position clearly on this point,
it appears that he reasoned in terms of a distinction between
evidentiary and jurisdictional consequences of an illegal sei-
zure-on the one hand, holding that the government cannot
derive evidentiary benefits from an illegal seizure but, on the
other hand, holding that a court can continue to exercise in
" See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd.,
889 F.2d 1258, 1266 (2d Cir. 1989).
210 United States v. $37,780, 189 WL 132005, at *2-*3.
211 Id. at *4.
212 United States v. $37,780, 920 F.2d at 163-64.
213 Id. at 162 (citing United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975)).
214 Id. at 162.
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rem jurisdiction over an illegal seized res.215 In following this
line of reasoning, Pratt was able to hold that the government
satisfied the "after" part of the equation.216 By the time of the
forfeiture proceeding, Pratt noted, governmental officials were
in a position to demonstrate that Hernandez had lied about his
employment and arrest status and his connection with Linda
Matias"' Moreover, they also were able to show that he had
been under surveillance for drug dealing at the time of the
seizure. The government, he held, had therefore satisfied its
burden of proof.21
Clearly, Judge Pratt's opinion raises important questions
about the nature of suppression and also about a court's power
to order the return of illegally seized property. Curiously, Pratt
addressed these questions in only the most cursory way; in-
deed, when one compares the three and one-half pages he
devoted to United States v. $37,780 with the seventeen he
devoted to Daccarett, one gains the impression that he was
impatient with the subtle problems that arise once property
has been illegally seized but deeply fascinated by the constitu-
tional questions connected with an initial interference with
property interests. Rather than continue to pore over Pratt's
opinion in United States v. $37,780, then, it will be best to
consider his conclusions in light of more general principles that
have a bearing on these issues. Let us turn first to the nature
of suppression and then consider orders of return.
1. The Nature of Suppression
At the heart of Judge Pratt's opinion is an assumption
about suppression: that suppression does not deny a court
jurisdiction over an illegally seized res but simply denies the
government the opportunity to gain an evidentiary benefit
from what it has seized. This assumption finds support by
analogy with the Supreme Court's illegal arrest cases, for the
Court has long held that the fact of an illegal arrest, while
depriving the government of the opportunity to make use of
215 Id. at 163.
216 Id. at 163-64.
217 United States v. $37,780, 920 F.2d at 163-64.
218 Id.
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evidence that is the fruit of an illegal arrest, does not deprive a
trial court of jurisdiction over the person illegally arrested.21 9
Given this point, we can see that suppression stands, under
current doctrine, as an information-depriving mechanism with-
in the courts. Its consequence is to deprive the government of
admissible evidence but not to deprive a court of jurisdiction
over a specific object, whether a res or a body. Given the analo-
gy provided by illegal arrest case law, Pratt was therefore
correct in his approach to suppression."'
A related point should also be noted here. Although he did
not comment on this, it appears that Judge Pratt believed that
the X-ray scanning officials did not violate Hernandez's privacy
interests on discovering the contents of his attache case. I
believe Pratt was also correct on this point-that is, given the
facts Pratt reported in his opinion, I think Hernandez can be
held to have consented to the X-ray scanning of his attache
case and can also be held to have consented to open it when
the scanning officials asked him to do so. However, it is impor-
tant to note the suppression consequences that would follow
from a conclusion that Herndandez's privacy interests had in
fact been violated. If this had been the case, then Pratt would
have had to hold the brief detention for questioning illegal and
so would have to hold that the answers Hernandez gave to the
X-ray scanning officials were tainted. By contrast, given Pratt's
(correct) conclusion that Hernandez's privacy interests were
not violated, he was able to treat as untainted the information
gained from the questioning and so was able to draw on that
information in holding that the government would have been
able to satisfy its burden of proof in the forfeiture proceed-
ing.22
1
219 See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
20 Judge Pratt advanced a further argument about suppression when he stated
that "the [Supreme] Court has suggested that in a civil forfeiture proceeding the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the forfeitable property itself." United States v.
$37,780, 920 F.2d at 163 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040
(1984)). One might interpret Pratt's statement as advancing the radical claim that
even information gained from the illegal seizure of property is not suppressible in
a civil forfeiture proceeding. However, in the remainder of United States v.
$37,780, he drew only on evidence which he claimed had been lawfully obtained.
221 Id. at 164.
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2. The Interplay of Suppression and Orders of Return
But while Judge Pratt's approach to suppression was
sound, he failed altogether to account for its relationship to
orders of return. In fact, Pratt said nothing about returning
property aside from noting that Judge Elfvin had issued an
order of return. Clearly, more was needed. I will begin by con-
sidering the order of return apart from its connection to sup-
pression and then examine how suppression can be inter-
twined with return.
The order of return is a straightforward remedy when no
information is available to justify a seizure. If a seizure of
property was unjustified at the time it was made and also
cannot be supported afterwards by relevant information, then
the remedy courts must employ is straightforward: they must
order the prompt return of the property, thereby restoring the
condition that prevailed prior to the wrong. Support for this
line of reasoning can be found by analogy with fourth amend-
ment liberty interests. In a line of cases that begins with
Gerstein v. Pugh,222 the Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment requires a prompt probable cause hearing
by a neutral and detached magistrate following arrest-indeed,
the Court has specifically held that "prompt" in this instance
means that, absent a weekend, holiday or some kind of unusu-
al circumstance, a hearing must be held within forty-eight
hours of an arrest."3 With Soldal having recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects property interests independently
of its protection of other interests,24 it is clear that the
Fourth Amendment imposes a mandate on the courts to order
the return of property the government has no justification in
holding.
But what if the government illegally gains a justification
for holding property in the course of seizing it-for example,
what if the government draws on information gained through a
privacy wrong committed prior to a seizure to justify that sei-
zure? As we know, this is not what happened in United States
v. $37,780, but it will be helpful to think about this point be-
222 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
22 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
224 Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544 n.7 (1993).
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fore turning to United States v. $37,780 itself. As it happens,
Weeks v. United States,225 the 1914 case generally considered
the one that established suppression doctrine, is directly con-
cerned with a sequence of events in which a privacy wrong
preceded a seizure. In securing evidence against Weeks, gov-
ernment officials illegally entered his home and examined
documents contained in his bureau drawers (thus the privacy
wrong). They then seized the documents and held them, antici-
pating that they would be used against Weeks at trial."6
Weeks, however, moved prior to trial for the documents' re-
turn. 7 Weeks's motion rested on the interplay of suppres-
sion and an order of return. In holding that the motion should
have been granted, the Supreme Court can be understood to
have concluded that the government could not use the infor-
mation gained from its privacy wrong (the examination of
Weeks's documents) to justify its property wrong (the seizure
and retention of those documents).' The Court can further
be understood to have concluded that since the government
had no other information to justify retention of the documents,
the trial court should have ordered their return to Weeks. Sup-
pression doctrine was in this sense connected with the sub-
stantive remedy of return-of-property. 9 Under this analysis,
suppression still functions as an information-depriving mecha-
nism; however, its effect is to further a substantive remedy
that vindicates rights of possession.
In United States v. $37,780, we confront a variation on
Weeks, one in which a property wrong has occurred (thus es-
tablishing a prima facie case for an order of return) but in
which the information the government subsequently secures
independently of the property wrong provides an after-the-fact
justification for the seizure. Judge Pratt simply did not consid-
er how courts should act in a setting such as this. His failure
to address this question is disturbing because his opinion
seems to allow the government to pursue a seize
now/investigate later strategy with respect to all private prop-
erty. That is, Pratt seems not to have been troubled by the
2- 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Id. at 389.
227 Id. at 393.
22' Id. at 398.
229 Id.
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possibility that the government can seize property illegally,
hold it for a substantial period of time, and then (provided it is
able to produce information about the property independently
of its wrong) secure the property's forfeiture. This approach
turns the Fourth Amendment on its head. The amendment
speaks of a right to be secure in one's house, papers and ef-
fects. The seize now/investigate later strategy, by contrast,
creates profound insecurity. It defeats the baseline expectation
of freedom from arbitrary government interference that is
implicit in all fourth amendment jurisprudence.23
If Judge Pratt's approach to the case was flawed, how,
then, should it have been resolved? The answer, I suggest,
hinges on the legality of the government's seizure of
Hernandez's cash. If we adopt Pratt's analysis and treat the
seizure as illegal, then we would also have to say that the
government had no justification for holding his cash and so
should have been ordered to return it to him promptly. Indeed,
if we were to say that the government's subsequent untainted
acquisition of information relevant to an illegal seizure could
be used to justify that seizure, we would then be treated to the
shabby spectacle of a race to the courthouse-with a claimant
seeking implementation of the constitutional mandate of
prompt return and the government seeking to delay this while
it tried to come up with untainted evidence to justify its initial
wrong. The better approach is to state flatly that the govern-
ment cannot hold property it has illegally seized. On this line
of reasoning, Judge Elfvin's approach to the case was essential-
ly correct and so should have been upheld.
But what if the seizure were held to be proper under the
Fourth Amendment? Although he toyed with the idea, Judge
Pratt was unprepared to hold that the mere fact that someone
is found to be in possession of large amounts of cash creates
probable cause to believe that the cash was derived from ille-
gal activity. On balance, Pratt was right as far as this specific
point is concerned. It may well be that, as a matter of empiri-
cal probability, most people who carry large amounts of cash
have derived it from illegal activity. It remains the case,
though, that some people accumulate their wealth from wholly
" For further development of this argument, see Heffernan, supra note 90, at
1220-28.
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legal sources and simply prefer to keep that wealth in cash
they can carry around. To reason in terms of probable cause
with respect to these wholly innocent owners would make it
necessary for them to prove their status in a forfeiture proceed-
ing-a wholly inappropriate burden given their complete inno-
cence as possessors.
However, one other option was open to Judge Pratt in
thinking about the initial seizure-the possibility of reasoning
not in terms of probable cause but in terms of reasonable sus-
picion. Under the rule announced in Terry v. Ohio,2"' govern-
ment officials are permitted to detain individuals on reason-
able suspicion (a lower standard than probable cause) for brief
periods of time while investigating the possibility of wrong-
doing.232 Terry is of course concerned with a seizure of the
person rather than a seizure of property, but the analogy be-
tween liberty and property interests is compelling here. In
dealing with airport seizures in which government officials
happen upon large amounts of cash, Pratt thus could have held
that the fact of such cash justifies brief interference with an
individual's possession of it while government officials investi-
gate its provenance. 3 Because Pratt did not consider this
approach to United States v. $37,780, he did not comment on
the length of time it took to question Hernandez, nor did he
comment on the speed with which they established that
Hernandez's answers to their questions were false. It is possi-
ble of course that the investigating officers did not penetrate
Hernandez's story within the brief period of time they are
allowed under Terry to convert reasonable suspicion into prob-
able cause. If they did not, then Judge Elfvin's disposition of
the case was correct. Whatever the specifics of United States v.
$37,780, however, Pratt could have used the case to establish a
framework in which government officials, consistently with the
231 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 20-22.
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court held that a 90-
minute airport detention based only on reasonable suspicion of a traveler and his
luggage violated the Fourth Amendment. There is a strong analogy between the
facts in Place and those in United States v. $37,780. Thus, in trying to give an
operational definition of term "brief interference" when it is applied to the deten-
tion of domestic airline travelers, one would have to say that it must be less than
90 minutes.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Fourth Amendment, can seize-first briefly, and then (with
probable cause established) for a longer period of time-large
amounts of cash they discover in the course of their work.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,234
decided twelve months after Soldal, the Supreme Court de-
clared that "[i]ndividual freedom finds tangible expression in
property rights."2 5 While Good was concerned with the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, its general comment on
individual freedom captures well the contemporary Court's
effort to rehabilitate property as a key category in constitution-
al law. Viewed in this light, Olmstead can be said to embody,
for fourth amendment purposes, the early twentieth-century
Court's veneration of property as the central constitutional
value; Katz, the mid-twentieth-century Court's relative indif-
ference to property interests; and Soldal, the contemporary
Court's cautious rehabilitation of property as a constitutionally
protected interest.
In this Article, I have traced the development of the Su-
preme Court's approach to fourth amendment property claims
and have also considered Second Circuit cases in light of the
Court's current doctrines. Ultimately, the Court will have to
consider questions about the relationship of property to privacy
claims, the weight to be assigned property claims, and the
relationship between suppression and motions for return of
property. My aim here has been to show how urgent these
issues have become now that the Court has held property in-
terests are independently protected by the Fourth Amendment.
2" 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
2" Id. at 505.
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